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How the Numbers Matter: Demographics and the
Future of Hindu-Christian Dialogue
Francis X. Clooney, S.J.
Boston College

Religious Demography ofIndia. A. P. Joshi,
M. D. Srinivas, and J. K. Bajaj. Chennai:
Centre for Policy Studies, 2003. xxii + 358
pp.

IN Religious Demography of India, Bajaj,
Joshi, and Srinivas analyze Indian census
data from 1871 to 1991, in order to assess
the shifts in demography in religious identity
in India and on that basis make predictions
about the future. They look closely into the
data regarding the various states of India,
and even the individual districts of those
states. The book, coming in two parts,
invites readers to study the data for
themselves: the first 175 pages offer an
analysis of census data, but pp. 179-346 are
comprised entirely of tables reporting data,
thus enabling readers to make up their own
minds.
Throughout, "India" refers to Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and India itself, here known as
"the Indian lmion." The book proposes a
homogeneous native tradition
kind of
comprised of "native religionists;" this
group includes all the various Hindu
traditions but also some other traditions too.
As critics have noted (see below), the book
is both overly generous and at the same time
stingy: "Indian religionists" include Hindus,
Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and also, strikingly,
Parsis and Jews, but none of

the Christian commumtIeS long and
peacefully established in India, such as the
Syriac Christians of Kerala, or the old
Catholic communities of Tamil Nadu.
Indeed, the Indian religionists are contrasted
with the two aggressive religions from the
West, Islam and Christianity.
In the first part of this essay I comment
directly on the book and reactions to it; in
the second, I survey a few of the reactions to
it in India; in the third, I sketch the
possibilities of a wider, more integral study
of the religious significance of demographic
changes; in the fourth, I suggest how
attention to it can affect Hindu-Christian
studies. First, though, an admission: two of
the authors' of Religious Demography of
India, M. D. Srinivas and J. K. Bajaj, are
friends of mine whom I am always happy to
visit when in Chennai. I begin with respect
for their integrity and seriousness about their
work. I have also admired the contemporary
analyses written and published by their
Centre for Policy Studies in Chennai:
Dharampal's Bharatiya Chitta Manas and
Kala (tr. by J. K. Bajaj; see the discussion of
this book in the Hindu-Christian Studies
Bulletin in 1995), their monograph on food,
food production, and hospitality, Annam
Bahu Kurvita, and a timely edited volume,
Ayodhya and the Future of India (1993,
edited by J. K. Bajaj). In my mind, these
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books demonstrate the authors' concern for
India's religious identity, studied in the
bright and harsh light of contemporary
issues. I therefore approached this new book
with a favorable attitude and willingness to
take their research seriously, and in fact
found Religious Demography a fascinating
if not entirely adequate basis for a fresh
assessment of "interreligious dialogue on the
ground" in South Asia today. Yet I also
write from Boston, and concede that
regarding this book, like other publications
from India, I may be missing some of the
contextual factors that mark Indian readings
of the book.

experienced the impact of growth of
these religions the most. Africa has
lost its Native Religionist moorings
during the twentieth century. And in
Asia, countries like Indonesia and
South Korea have seen their
religious complexion change fairly
thoroughly. On the other hand, an
ancient civilization like that of
China has countenanced no change
in its religious profile, nor have the
relatively more recent civilizational
religions of the world like West
Asia, North Africa and Europe
swayed from their adopted faiths.
(pp. 174-175)

1.

At the book's start, the authors soberly
assess
the
situation,
stating
their
presupposition and conclusion:
India, on the whole, has resisted
of
Christianization;
proportion
Christians in India remains around 2
percent. And, India has not
succumbed to the .expansion of
Islam like some countries of
Africa." (p. xxii). But Indian
experience of the twentieth century
has not been nearly as robust as that
of China, where "not only the
proportion but also the absolute
number of Muslims ... has declined;
and Christianity has failed to fmd
any foothold. (p. xxii)
At the book's end, the authors'
perspective is broadened toward a global
overview:
Thus, seen in the perspective of the
changing religious demography .of
the world during the. twentieth
century, [the] Indian situation does
not seem too alarming. Christianity
and Islam have both made
substantial gains in the world. But it
is Africa and some relatively
smaller countries in Asia that have
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Partition and other factors have led to an
erosion of the Indian religions, yet there is
hope for the future: "[M]uch of the country
has remained largely immune to the advance
of Christianity or Islam. Indian Religionists
have maintained a dominant presence in
almost all 'the northwestern, western, central
and southern parts of the Indian Union ... In
th1s vast region, Indian Religionists have
shown great vitality; any tendency towards
significant erosion of their share in any
pocket of this region has often been swiftly
neutralized." (p. 17 5) Yet concern is still
warranted: "Such vitality, however, has not
helped [Indian religionists] in, defending
their presence on the borders of the country
where the efforts of the society, to be
effective, necessarily need the vigilance and
support of a state committed to protecting
and preserving the civilizational identity,
pride and genius of the nation. We have so
far failed to fashion such a state for
ourselves." (p. 175)
The tone of nervousness about the
proximity of one's others is reflected in the
names of the chapters: "states where Indian
religionists dominate," "states where Indian
religionist$ are under pressure," and "states
where Indian religionists are turning a
minority." It is as if Samuel Huntington's
hypertense Clash of Civilizations was on the
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bookshelf right next to the volumes of
census data.
Describing interreligious prospects on
the basis of census data inevitably leads to
oversimplification, since the relationship
among religions is read in tenns of ever
more glaring numbers, while various less
easily quantified phenomena are left out of
consideration. Caste is left out, for instance,
as are other social, political and cultural
factors that might affect how religious
people change their identities or fashion
identities that cut across religious divides.
Change occurs and is counted; religions are
aggre~sive or· moderate or resistant; but the
human persons who make choices shaping
these changes are never mentioned. Beyond
parents deciding how large a family to
produce, presumably communities are
comprised of agents able to decide how
communities should respond and act in the
fact of similar decisions made by people in
other traditions. The identity of the agents of
religious change and their motives as well
require deeper investigation, even if we can
also say that there is no one entirely in
charge of the religious changes occurring
today. There are religious changes, and
attention must be given to the agents of that
change - missionaries and Dalits, the ultraorthodox and the Mumbai elite, the
politicians and the religious refonners who surely have their own plans and their
own ways of reading the data. Even the
word "conversion" appears not to occur in
the book (which has no subject index), even
though this key phenomenon - seeking to
convert others, choosing to convert - must
be closely connected to the trends that
presumably disturb the authors.
The analytic chapter concluding Part
One of the book borrows data from the
World Christian Encyclopedia to put those
findings into the context of the wider global
pattern of religious demographic changes.
Here the authors again simplify the
demographic portrait by including among
the majority group in each part of the world
the "non-religionists" and "atheists" listed in
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the areas. As a result, the areas of the world
are simplified into religious blocks
belonging to one religion or another, and the
scenario is set for imagining a stark and too
clear division
between
civilizations
(perhaps) in (inevitable) clash, or at least
competition, with one another. Again,
Huntington seems to be in the
neighborhood.
II.

Religious Demography received a great deal
of attention in India after its release, in part
because it addresses very sensitive issues
related to India's religious identity and the
future of Hinduism. It was also introduced at
a high profile conference in Delhi in
October 2003, where L. K.Advani, Deputy
Prime Minister, released the book. Mr.
Advani also wrote a laudatory foreword, in
which he praises it as a guide to the
"infonned judgments" Indian will have to
make about "the strategic pressures India is
likely to face. within its neighborhood in the
near future." (p. xv) Some reviews praise the
book's conscientious use of detail, its
eschewal of heated rhetoric, and its sober
assessment of a crucial topic. It is valued by
many as a work that will remain an essential
reference for decades to come.
But Religious Demography has also
been severely criticized. The authors are
charged with drawing selectively on the
voluminous census data, consulting only the
religious data and thus oversimplifying the
issues. They are also accused of a clumsy
and amateur use of statistics, though rarely
do the critics explain how statisticians
should interpret the data. The book is
accused of idealizing an ancient and
homogenous Indian past, in part by its odd
and problematic categories. Indeed, it is odd
that all Jews and all Parsis counted as
"Indian religionists" while all Christians and
all Muslims are denied this status, portrayed
instead as members of aggressive and alien
religious communities.
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Some cntlclsms cut deeply. In The
Telegraph (Calcutta, July 10, 2003), Partha
Chatterjee calls the volume "shockingly
clUde" in its underlying "social science
theory." Without much ado she dismisses
the notion of an ancient "homogenous
religious civilization" and in a shorthand
theology asserts that the postulation of a
timeless sanatana dharma "makes nonsense
of all accumulated textual, historical and
anthropological scholarship on Indian
religions." So too, she terms clUde the
division of the world into Islamic, Christian,
and native religions: "[the authors']
understanding of religion and religious
communities is so blissfully ignorant of all
social science that one can only attribute it
to the intellectual innocence of former
physical scientists." In The Week (July 27
2003) B. G. Verghese links Religious
Demography to the divisive views of
Savarkar, Hedgewar, and Golwalkar, and
reads it as favoring a cultural nationalism
that in fact has "little reverence for tme faith
and tradition," however these might be
defined. The authors, he says, see India's
pluralism· and diversity as "a cancer that
must be contained if not eradicated." He
suggests that its claims rely on a "bogus
sociology" which oversimplifies the "Indian
religions" and conceals the underlying
tensions within Hinduism, b~etween Hindus
and Buddhists and Jains, and along caste
lines. The book's call for a national culture
is tantamount to an appeal for "cultural
sameness" bludgeoned into existence by
"sundry cavemen." In People's Democracy
(September 28, 2003), Nalini Taneja rails
against this "fraudulent study" as a
"demonizing demography" pretending to be
social science, while in fact being nothing
but a govemment subsidized justification for
"ethnic cleansing." The book, in Teneja's
view, avoids engaging the problem of
defining Hinduism and conjures up a pure,
simple Hindu past - and doing all this for
the sake of encouraging (as the dust jacket
puts it) "the task of nation building," "with
an abiding passion." The book is backward

https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol17/iss1/6
DOI: 10.7825/2164-6279.1315

looking, out of touch, and dangerous;
perhaps, but Taneja is no more forthcoming
with proof of her charges or indications of a
better way to read the statistics.
These wamings are at least a bit
overheated, and they are perhaps aimed
really at the' Hindu right wing the book is
taken to symbolize. The effect, though, is
that such reviewers seem to absolve
themselves of addressing the specific issues
raised by the book. While, Religious
Demography might be used by paranoid and
vicious elements in Indian society, it need
not be inextricably bound to the far right.
More trenchant and developed criticisms are
to be found at the South Asian Citizen Web,
www.sacw.net/2002/daval040n003.html.
where John Dayal, in an essay subtly
entitled, "Lies, Half TlUths and Statistics,"
offers a lengthy critique of the book,
disputing almost every interpretation. His
analysis, too detailed to rehearse here,
emphasizes mainly that the book is alarmist,
prone to read data in an unnecessarily dour
fashion, seeing decline and threats where
there are none. I am not convinced that
Dayal has succeeded in demolishing the
authors' main points, but his critique is a
valuable companion to the book.
Whatever their skills in statistical
analysIs, I see no evidence that the authors
are trying to obfuscate matters or promote
hysteria without discussion. Even the book's
oddities - Jews and Parsis as Indian
religionists, little nuance regarding Hindu
traditions or caste, etc. - are so manifestly
evident and at the forefront, unconcealed,
that it is hard to charge' the authors with
doing anything other than what they claim to
be doing: putting the statistics before the
reader because, in their view, the data raise
concems about the future. Perhaps others
can interpret the data better, and it will be
for the better were they to undertake an
exhaustive study of the census data and offer
their own, better prognosis.

I

, III.
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In fact, religious identities are changing
constantly, and our authors are simply
joining other observers of the hastening pace
of religious demographic shifts. In his The
Next Christendom: The Coming of Global
Christianity (Oxford University Press,
2002), Philip Jenkins reminds us of a global
shift in the nature of Christianity. He too is
cautious but insistent about the importance
of demographics: "Projecting demographic
changes as far ahead as fifty years in the
future seems like a risky venture... Yet the
process of Christian expansion outside
Europe and the West does seem inevitable,
and the picture offered here is based solidly
on
current
trends,
religious
and
demographic. In this instance, the
foolishness seems justified." (p. 79) And
Jenkins too sees a dramatic demographic
shift under way:
One central fact in the changing
religious picture is a massive
relative decline in the proportion of
the world's people who live in the
traditionally advanced nations. If we
combine the figures for Europe,
North America, and the lands of the
former Soviet Union, then in 1900,
these Northern regions accounted
for 32 percent of the world
population. Viewed over the span of
world history, that may have been
an untypically large proportion,
which ,reflected the explosive
of the
demographic
growth
industrial revolution years. Over the
course of the twentieth century,
matters reverted to what was likely a
more typical preindustrial norm, as
the proportion of peoples living in
the advanced nations fell, slowly at
first, but then more dramatically. By
1950, the share had fallen a little to
29 percent, but the rate of
contraction then accelerated, to 25
percent in 1970, and around 18
percent by 2000. By 2050, the figure
should be around 10 or 12 percent.
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Relative growth rates in the South
have been just as impressive. Africa
and Latin America combined made
up only 13 percent of the world's
people in 1900, but that figure has
now grown to 21 percent. Every
indication suggests that the rate of
change is accelerating. By 2050,
Africa and Latin America will
probably be home to 29 percent of
the world's people. In. 1900,
"Northerners" outnumbered these
"Southerners" by about 2.5 to one;
by 2050, the proportions will be
almost exactly reversed. Overall,
global population stands at 6 billion
today, and should reach 9 billion
around 2050, but that increase will
not be equitably distributed around
the globe. Southern nations are
growing very rapidly, while their
Northern neighbors are relatively
static." (pp. 79-80)
Jenkins also takes a step that the authors
of Religious Demography do not; he
reminds us that the shift is not just a matter
of an unchanging Christianity experiencing
movement, but of the arising of a newly
configured dominant Christianity:
The types of Christianity that have
thrived most successfully in the
global South have been very
different
from
what
many
Europeans and North Americans
consider mainstream. These models
have been far more enthusiastic,
much more centrally concerned with
th,e immediate workings of the
supernatural, through prophecy,
VISIOns, ecstatic utterances, and
healing ... Nor is this question of
authenticity just a matter of
academic interest. If in fact the bulk
of the Christian population is going
to be living in Africa, Asia, or Latin
America, then practices that now
prevail in those areas will become

5
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ever more common across the globe.
This is especially likely when those
distinctive religious patterns are
transplanted northward, either by
migration, or by actual missions to
the old imperial powers, to what
were once the core nations of world
Christianity." (pp. 107-108)
If we see that similar shifts are occurring in
other religions too - think of the current
self-scrutiny occurring among Muslims
globally (see for instance, Lawrence Rosen,
The Culture of Islam: Changing Aspects of
Contemporary Muslim Life, University of
Chicago, 2002), or the changing face of
Buddhism (see for instance, James Coleman,
The New Buddhism:
The
Western
Transformation of an Ancient Tradition,
Oxford University Press, 2001) - then the
"we" of global religiosity too is changing
more dramatically, and not just in numbers.
Tracking the numbers, without exploring
more qualitative issues, is only a small part
of a larger and even more interesting story.
In other words, shifting demographics
indicate also a shift in how religious
identities will be understood and felt in the
next centuries. Religious Demography
would have been a stronger book has its
authors explored the context of their
numbers, and been more venturesome in
their descriptions of the possible substantive
changes in Hinduism as the religion wanes
in some area,s and grows in others. Cannot
we not imagine a global Hinduism that is
changing in broader ways that are
irreducible to the valid but limited task of
counting Hindus in the districts and states of
India?
IV.

To this reviewer, neither a statistician nor a
social scientist, Religious Demography
succeeds in bringing to the forefront a topic
that requires discussion. It raises urgent
questions, hard to ignore, as to the domain
and climate in which dialogue occurs. We
would be mistaken to avoid its questions
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simply on the grounds that the same
statistics bear further and more nuanced
readings; the authors have done the service
of making it possible to argue about the
meaning of the changing numbers. It is
evident that India is changing, and it is not a
sure thing that Hindu traditions will remain
in the majority in the centuries to come.
Were I a Hindu, I would be thinking hard
about Hindu identity and its future in a
world where Christians and Muslims both
have devoted much energy to the conversion
of members of other religions.
Indeed, Religious Demography seems to
tap successfully into real concerns Indian
Hindus have about the future of their
religion and culture and nation; even the
harsh criticisms of the book suggest that
sore points have been touched. It does so
with a sober array of statistics which,
however interpreted, reminds us that change
IS
occurrmg and change matters. It
3;ccentuates, if not aggravates, a more
urgent situation in which a more urgent
confessional accounting is required. That the
book has this value and deserves our
attention does not do away with the
legitimate concerns underlying it; but it does
force us to reflect on how demographics
mark necessarily
deeper theological
concerns about which the authors might say
more.
The book is so informative that it can
confuse by its numbers and push timid
readers back into generalities in favor of or
against the book. But the matters have to
become more complex; to. understand what
is occurring today requires a shift to a level
of more· complex social and religious·
analysis wherein issues like caste cannot be
left out or finessed by broad categorizations
that downplay divisions and highlight
commonalities; it requires a religious angle,
as religious intellectuals are required to
respond to a real life situation where the
demographics give way to some deeper
consideration of how complex religious
identities resist counting, and elude the
simplifications of demographics. Dividing

6

Clooney: How the Numbers Matter: Demographics and the Future of Hindu-Christian Dialogue

18 Francis X. Clooney, S.l
the world in religious blocks aids us in
formulating a simple picture, but much of
human experience has to do with blurring
such boundaries, as people in countries like
India or the United States become
increasingly disposed to borrow from other
traditions. What it means to be Hindu or
Muslim or Christian is not decided by
historians or sociologists, but by intelligent
insiders to traditions who present their ideas
in ways that are at least open to conversation
with outsiders willing to listen and speak.
Statistics on religion require a
theological response if they are to be
tmderstood properly; it is not for a
statistician or a government employee to
define quantitatively what Hinduism is, or
what Christianity is. The clumsiness in the
book in defining "Indian religionists" is due
in large part to the decision of the authors
not to engage the larger, reflective questions.
Eventually, believers need to be called upon
to explain the relationship of the essentials
of their traditions to changes marked by
demography.' The ecology of religious
equilibrium and interchange cannot be
assessed merely by numbers, and there
needs to be the involvement of believers
willing to discuss what the numbers mean. It
will not work to explain changes only at a
level where change is due to an international
or governmental strategy. To think more
deeply about what Christianity or Islam or
Hinduism is' would upset the count, and
make it difficult to state simply what exactly
the census was counting. To fall back on an
old phrase: the better census would have to
be one in which believers are allowed to
stand up and be counted.
This leads me to my final reflection on
how Religious Demography might be useful
in transfonning our negotiation of the
Hindu-Christian relationship, including
scholarly exchange. Cenainly, the book
provides a distinctive context for HinduChristian studies. It reminds us of larger
patterns of religious demographics that
inevitably affect individuals interested in
interreligious study. Involved individuals are
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members of larger communities. We need to
keep reminding ourselves that social
patterns affect theologies, and even census
data can play a part in a real and wellgrounded conversation.
Conversations
across
religious
boundaries, including the scholarly HinduChristian conversations exemplified in this
journal, must be placed within a frame
where we keep noticing the dynamics of
change occurring around us. Just as 100
years ago one could hardly discuss religious
ideas comparatively without noticing the
encompassing dynamics of colonialism, so
too now, the demographics of each area of
the world and the global scene itself must be
noticed. Religions are not, and never were,
timeless, and cannot speak merely from and
of timeless essences. Those of us in either
tradition, and those of us who study one or
both, are therefore challenged to locate our
reflection .in the context of the changing
world scene, wherein our work is either
helpful, Or irrelevant and missing the point
as to where people are today, or even
harmful, in the sense of distracting attention
from the issues "on the ground" that matter
to individuals and communities inside and
outside India.
111 the end, Religious Demography is a
worried and somewhat gloomy book;
surprisingly, a more theological. perspective
might have led to a more optimistic one.
Christians have found, even in the West, that
the increasing presence of people of other
religious traditions invites and even
encoUrages learning with and from the other.
If other traditions are clearly going to be
present in India and not to fade away, even
after the possibility of military and
economic enforcement of conversions is
ruled out, then the new demographics will
prompt a new and in theory unending
conversation of Hindus with more, and more
varied, non-Hindu neighbors. Add to this the
increasing interaction of Hindus and nonHindus in the West, and we can see that the
Hindu and Christian modes of dealing with
others may be changing in a fundamental
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fashion, as we lose count of who belongs in
which place.
It would be an interesting thought
experiment to imagine the future - let's
say, 100 years from now, or 200 - and ask
how it might matter for Hindu-Christian
relations were the demographics to shift
even more radically. If Christianity was
about to disappear from India, how might
Hindus react? Some might not react at all.
Jews are not foreigners in this book, but as
their numbers wane to almost nothing in
India, there seems to be no outcry from
Hindus (including the authors) about the loss
of these venerable Indian religionists. One
wonders whether the authors might not react
in the same way to the disappearance of the
old Christian communities of south India.
Similarly, were Hindu traditions to become,
for instance, a minority in India itself,
should the Christian interest in interreligious
exchange decline? I hope not. Would
sympathetic Christians help explain, defend,
and revitalize Hindu traditions, as if
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preserving an endangered species? I hope
so.
Yet all such possible or probable
demographic changes can only count as
factors in how religious groups make their
decisions about how to understand and relate
to one another; there are no merely set,
merely static religious groups, and are no
enduring conversations among believers
who imagine their selves and the selves of
others to be entirely, unchangingly settled. If
we leam anything in dialogue, we leam to
need one another, religiously. If so, it might
also become a religious task to keep alive
the diversity of the traditions that so
characterize both India and North America:
to keep counting, not out of fear or triumph,
but out of joy at who we are becoming. I for
one therefore hope for a companion volume
an imaginative
from
our authors,
(re)construction of Hindu identity that goes
beyond the necessary groundwork of this
valuable
but
incomplete
volume.
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